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Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Fourteenth Amendment has long presented interpretive challenges for
the courts.' Although its ratification was a direct response to the problems of
Reconstruction, the Amendment's broad language made its application outside
2
the context of race at least possible, if not probable. Yet literal application of
the Amendment's broad language presented a paradox in the Equal Protection
context: Since virtually all legislation creates classifications, and classifications
almost necessarily entail differential treatment between groups, broad, literal
application of the Amendment would invalidate nearly all legislation.
3
In part to resolve this tension, the Supreme Court has adopted differing
standards against which to test the validity of legislation that is challenged un-
der the Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.4 While
legislation that classifies on the basis of race or other "suspect" characteristics
or that involves fundamental rights is subject to some heightened form of scru-
tiny, most legislation is subject only to rational basis review. Rational basis re-
view, designed to be minimally searching and maximally deferential to legisla-
tive judgment, requires only that there be a "rational relationship between the
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." 5 Thus, the
application of rational basis review under this standard almost invariably results
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2005. The author would like to thank Matt Levine for his help in
editing this Case Note.
1. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The essential
problem of the Equal Protection Clause is therefore the one of determining where the courts are to look
for guidance in defining 'equal' as that word is used in the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Amendment
provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
2. MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
50-52 (1999).
3. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 779 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. See Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of
Congruence, Divergence and Judicial Difference, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 591, 592-93 (1989). Different
standards of review also made it possible for the Court to uphold racial classifications under certain cir-
cumstances. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("That is not to say that all such re-
strictions [which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group] are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
5. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Heightened scrutiny requires more stringent review of
the government's purposes and the means by which it achieves them. Doherty, supra note 4, at 594-96.
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6in legislation being upheld.
Yet in a recent decision, Craigmiles v. Giles,7 the Sixth Circuit reached the
surprising result that a piece of ordinary economic legislation, subject only to
rational basis review, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. This Case Note will argue that this
decision is an unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.8 and illustrates the need for
Supreme Court clarification of the appropriate standards of review under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to provide guidance to lower court
judges and to litigants.
I. THE CASE
Although most Tennessee citizens will be affected by the dictates of the
Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA) only when they or a loved one
passes away, there are a few Tennessee citizens for whom the Act is of much
more continuous consequence: Tennessee funeral directors, embalmers, and
casket salesmen. It was a group of the latter that challenged the FDEA's appli-
cation to their businesses. 9 The FDEA, originally passed in 1951, required that
all individuals engaged in "funeral directing" be licensed by the Board of Fu-
neral Directors and Embalmers. 10 In 1972, at the behest of the funeral home in-
dustry, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the legislation, so the term
"funeral directing" would include those who sold caskets and funeral merchan-
dise. II As a result, the Board issued a cease and desist order to Nathaniel
Craigmiles and the other plaintiffs to prevent them from operating their funeral
merchandise stores without employing a licensed funeral director.
12
Craigmiles and the other plaintiffs sought an injunction against the Board's
order, claiming that the FDEA, to the extent that it restricted the sale of funeral
merchandise, violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and
See also, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("For
that [rationality] test, too, when applied as articulated, leaves little doubt about the outcome; the chal-
lenged legislation is always upheld.").
7. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
8. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
9. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222-23.
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-309 (1997). Licensing required passing the Tennessee Funeral Arts
Examination and completing either one year of course work at an accredited mortuary school and a one-
year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director or completing a two-year apprenticeship. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 62-5-305.
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(ii) (1997). The legislation in its original form applied only
to those individuals who arranged funeral ceremonies, burials, cremations, and embalming. Craigmiles,
312 F.2d at 222.
12. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223.
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Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted their request, holding that the
FDEA violated plaintiffs' due process and equal protection rights. 14 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, with Judge Boggs writing for a unanimous panel.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion quickly disposed of the question of the proper level
of review, recognizing that the legislation could only be subjected to rational
basis review. 15 Yet the rational basis review it employed was hardly typical.
II. "RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE"
Near the conclusion of its opinion, the Sixth Circuit's panel acknowledged
the obvious: "Judicial invalidation of economic regulation under the Fourteenth
Amendment has been rare in the modem era."' 6 Indeed, not since 1937 has the
Supreme Court regularly invalidated economic regulation. 17 In the opinion that
epitomizes the judicial activism of the pre-1937 period, Lochner v. New York, 18
the Supreme Court refused to defer to legislative judgments about the proper
uses of economic regulation. Both Justices Harlan and Holmes challenged the
majority's position in dissents that would be validated in the post-1937 period.
While Justice Harlan challenged the majority for not according appropriate def-
erence to legislative judgments, Justice Holmes attacked the very notion of sub-
stantive due process that underlay Lochner.19 He argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment was being used to elevate a particular economic theory to the level
of Constitutional right: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Her-
bert Spencer's Social Statics."
20
In 1937, the Court's decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish21 brought the
era of economic substantive due process to an abrupt end. Subsequent cases,
such as United States v. Carolene Products22 and Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co.,23 showed just how deferential rational basis review would be in this new
period. Yet despite this disavowal of substantive due process in 1937, it soon
reemerged. In Griswold v. Connecticu2 4 and Roe v. Wade,25 the Supreme Court
13. Id.
14. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
15. Judge Boggs somewhat sardonically noted, "While feared by many, morticians and casket re-
tailers have not achieved the protected status that requires a higher level of scrutiny under our Equal
Protection jurisprudence." Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
16. ld. at 229.
17. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1509, 1513-25 (1993);
David M. Gold, The Tradition of Substantive Judicial Review: A Case Study of Continuity in Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 52 ME. L. REv. 355,377 (2000).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. Id. at 68, 75-76.
20. Id. at 75.
21. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
23. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ushered in the modem era of substantive due process in a non-economic con-
text when it recognized the right to privacy, thereby evincing a renewed will-
ingness to recognize rights not explicitly grounded in the Constitution.26
Just as the Court breathed new life into non-economic substantive due proc-
ess in the 1960s, it gave new bite to rational basis review in a non-economic
context in the 1980s. In the 1985 case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to a city ordi-
nance that required a special-use permit for the construction of a home for the
mentally ill, but found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied. The Court
acknowledged that "when social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal
Protection Clause allows the states wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes
that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes., '28 Yet while it acknowledged in words the deference that is sup-
posed to accompany rational basis review, it did not apply it in practice. As Jus-
tice Marshall noted in his concurrence, the Court's analysis in Cleburne seemed
at odds with traditional rational basis review in almost every respect. The Court
acted as though the legislature had the burden of proving the act's constitution-
ality, sifted through the record to determine whether there was a firm factual
foundation for the ordinance's policy, and acted as though legislation was not
permitted to allow reform to proceed incrementally.
29
Justice Marshall did more than simply point out the Court's deployment of
heightened rational basis review; he also criticized it. While the Court's use of
this heightened review might have produced a welcome result in Cleburne, he
cautioned that "by failing to articulate the factors that justify today's 'second
order' rational basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for
determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked., 30 The result of
such doctrinal ambiguity would be, he feared, an open invitation to lower court
judges to invoke this "second order rational basis review" in reviewing legisla-
tion involving economic and commercial classifications where heightened scru-
tiny would traditionally have been deemed inappropriate. The majority's deci-
sion was, he warned, "a small and regrettable step back toward the days of
Lochner v. New York.
'31
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See Alfred Hill, The Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1237, 1273-76 (1990).
27. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
28. Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 458-9 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).





The Sixth Circuit's opinion is, if not itself a return to Lochner, an even lar-
ger step in that direction. Despite the Sixth Circuit's explicit rejection of this
notion, 32 its decision is fundamentally at odds with the traditional paradigm of
rational basis review. The Sixth Circuit's opinion reads much more like the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Cleburne than like the more traditional rational basis
review epitomized by cases like Williamson v. Lee Optical. In Williamson, the
Court upheld an Oklahoma law that made it unlawful for any person who was
not a licensed optometrist or opthamologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate
or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except with a written
prescription.33 A comparison between Craigmiles and Williamson is illustrative
of just how great a departure the review in Craigmiles is from traditional ra-
tional basis review.
In Craigmiles, the court conceded that the justifications given by the state
(the promotion of the public health and consumer protection) were legitimate
interests, but it argued that there was no reasonable relationship between those
interests and the legislation in question. The court rejected the state's argument
that the legislation would contribute to the public health since the plaintiffs'
businesses were not involved in the handling of dead bodies.34 In Williamson,
however, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that an eyeglass frame
could not be regulated because it was only casually related to the visual care of
the public. According to the Court, "an eyeglass frame is not used in isola-
tion... it is used with lenses; and lenses, pertaining as they do to the human
eye, enter the field of health. Therefore, the legislature might conclude that to
regulate one effectively it would have to regulate the other."
35
While conceding that the state could have achieved legitimate casket-safety
goals by requiring that funeral directors be experts, instead of by directly regu-
lating corpse containers, the Sixth Circuit found that the licensed funeral direc-
tors were not expert enough to support this justification. It noted the absence of
evidence establishing that the caskets they sold were systematically more pro-
tective than those sold by independent casket retailers.36 In reaching these con-
clusions, the Craigmiles court disregarded the admonitions of Carolene Prod-
ucts that there is no need for an evidentiary record under rational basis review
and that empirical judgments are best left to the legislature.37
The Sixth Circuit also rejected Tennessee's consumer protection analysis,
32. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 ("Our decision today is not a return to Lochner, by which this court
would elevate its economic theory over that of legislative bodies.").
33. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
34. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225.
35. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490.
36. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225-26.
37. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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arguing that the legislation was not fitted to the state's proffered interests. It did
this despite the fundamental tenet of rational basis review that legislation may
be over-inclusive or under-inclusive. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, legis-
latures need not "prohibit all like evils, or none." 38 Under rational basis review,
the determination of the appropriate breadth of legislation is left to the legisla-
ture.39 In Williamson, for example, the Supreme Court observed, "The Okla-
homa law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages
of the new requirement. 'AO In fact, the Craigmiles court acknowledged that ra-
tional basis review "does not require the best or most finely honed legislation to
be passed. '41
Why then was the Craigmiles court so concerned about the over-breadth of
the Tennessee legislation? Clearly, it believed the reasons the state gave were
mere pretext, and that the real reason for the legislature's actions was "protect-
ing licensed funeral directors from competition on caskets. ',42 The court, citing
a series of cases under the Commerce Clause, argued that "protecting a discrete
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose." 43 Yet this point is relevant only if there is no other legitimate state
interest to which the legislation might reasonably be related. If there is, it does
not matter if that was not the interest the legislature had in mind. As the court
itself acknowledged elsewhere in the opinion, legislative motivations are irrele-
vant to determinations of legislation's constitutionality under rational basis re-
view.4 4 This point was made in Williamson where the legislature was almost
certainly motivated by a desire to provide economic protection to optometrists,
yet the Supreme Court upheld the legislation.45 In that case, the Court simply
speculated as to other legitimate state interests to which the legislature might
have been responding.
46
While traditional rational basis review does not require an inquiry into leg-
islative motivations when evaluating the constitutionality of overbroad legisla-
tion, rational basis review is no longer defined exclusively by cases like Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical. Instead, lower courts can look to cases like Cleburne in
deciding how closely to scrutinize legislation. Unlike Williamson, Cleburne
seemed to require, or at least to encourage, this inquiry into legislative motiva-
38. Id. at 151.
39. Id.
40. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
41. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227.
42. Id. at 228.
43. Id. at 224.
44. Id. (quoting Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
45. See Chris M. Franchetti, Not Seeing Eye to Eye: Chapter 8 and the Battle Over Prescription
Eyewear, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 474, 489 (1999).
46. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
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tions. In deciding that the city council was really motivated by animus toward
the disabled, the Cleburne Court noted that the city could have passed better-
tailored regulations if its proffered reasons were anything more than pretext.
47
Cleburne is, unsurprisingly, the one case the Craigmiles court cites for the
proposition that the Supreme Court has been "suspicious of a legislature's cir-
cuitous path to legitimate ends when a direct path is available.
'A8
Because the Sixth Circuit panel believed the state's proffered interests were
mere pretext, it argued that there was no reasonable relationship between those
interests and the FDEA. Yet an Oklahoma district court judge found otherwise
when he upheld similar legislation a few weeks later.49 It is in precisely this
type of situation-where reasonable people can disagree about whether there is
a reasonable relationship between the legislation and the governmental pur-
pose-that Justices Harlan and Holmes believed the courts should defer to the
legislative judgment.50
In fact, the court's excoriation of the "General Assembly's naked attempt to
raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from
consumers" reveals what was likely the court's real motivation in this case: its
strong disapproval of the legislature's economic choices. 51 Thus, both Craig-
miles and Lochner are ultimately based on laissez-faire principles; in Lochner,
the Supreme Court invalidated the legislature's interference with individuals'
"freedom of contract" and, in Craigmiles, the Sixth Circuit invalidated the leg-
islature's attempt to accord protection to a particular economic group. In Wil-
liamson, by contrast, the Court allowed a clearly protectionist statute to stand
despite its harm to consumers.
While the anti-protectionism policy expressed in Craigmiles might make
for better economic policy, the post-Lochner line of cases clearly repudiate ju-
dicial efforts to enshrine economic policies, even if ultimately wise, as constitu-
tional rights. Under traditional rational basis review, the legislation would
stand, and it would be the Tennessee General Assembly that would be held ac-
countable.
IV. THE CLEBURNE LEGACY
In its opinion, the Craigmiles panel noted that the Sixth Circuit has previ-
ously observed that "rational basis review, while deferential, is not toothless. 52
Cleburne gave rational basis review teeth, and since that decision, lower courts,
47. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
48. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227.
49. Powers v. Harris, 71 U.S.L.W. 1389 (W.D. Okla. 2002).
50. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68, 75 (1905) (Harlan and Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
51. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229.
52. Id. at 229 (quoting Peoples Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 532 (6th Cir.
1998)).
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litigators, and legal scholars have all struggled to make sense of that decision
and the reasoning behind it. They have sought to understand when more search-
ing scrutiny of classifications that involve neither fundamental rights nor "sus-
pect" groups is appropriate. It is possible that the Court's use of "second order"
rational basis review was an effort to provide greater rights to groups to whom
it was unwilling to extend suspect status. 53 It is also possible that the Court's
use of "second order" review was a step toward the granting of "suspect" status
to these groups. 54 Arguably, the Supreme Court's application of more tradi-
tional rational basis review in a subsequent case involving the mentally dis-
abled undercuts those justifications.55 Yet the dissenters in that case criticized
the majority for failing to apply the level of review applied in Cleburne since
legislation involving the mentally disabled was once again at issue. The dissent
thereby suggested that the Court's use of "second order" review in Cleburne
was based on the fact that the class challenging the legislation was mentally
disabled.56
Thus, if the Supreme Court's use of "second order" rational basis review
has been predicated on the Court's heightened concern for specific groups, its
use should be limited to those contexts. Although the Supreme Court did not
articulate its reasoning for using a heightened form of rational basis review in
Cleburne, neither did it express an intention to fundamentally alter the way ra-
tional basis review is applied in all contexts. Furthermore, subsequent decisions
reaffirmed that "second order" review should be the exception, not the norm.
57
Thus, Cleburne and subsequent decisions have left the Supreme Court's Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause jurisprudence unclear, both as to the num-
ber of standards of review and as to how those standards should be applied.58
53. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (noting the diffi-
culty in "find[ing] a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups" as a reason for denying the
mentally disabled suspect status); see also Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes
Back to the Dentist's Chair: Can the Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 167, 174 (1994).
54. See Jerald W. Rogers, Note, Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny Has Found a Rational Ba-
sis-Is the Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect Status for Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals?, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 953, 954 (1997). This would not be the first time that the Supreme Court first struck down
legislation under rational basis review before conferring suspect status on a group. Compare Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rational basis for gender), with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (inter-
mediate scrutiny for gender).
55. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). One commentator observed that Heller v. Doe "fully rein-
stated the Lee Optical paradigm of rational basis review." Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Ra-
tional Basis Review, and the Impact ofCleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591,635 (1999-2000).
56. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 336-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
57. E.g., Heller.
58. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 312-
7 (1997) (arguing that the Court has shown a "renewed interest in government purposes" of which "ra-
tional basis with bite" may provide the "clearest example."); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights:
The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 226 (2002)
(arguing that there are not three, but seven standards of review).
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Since Cleburne, legal commentators have been urging the Court to provide
clarification on both these issues.
5 9
The decision in Craigmiles was an unwarranted use of the "second order"
rational basis review articulated in Cleburne that, despite the court's disavow-
als, seems to bear a closer resemblance to cases like Lochner than to cases like
Williamson v. Lee Optical. It was just this consequence that Justice Marshall
feared would result from the doctrinal confusion created by the Cleburne
Court's use of "second order" rational basis review. If the members of the cur-
rent Court share Justice Marshall's apprehension about a return to the days of
Lochner, they should heed the warning he provided in his Cleburne concur-
rence and provide some much needed clarification of the proper standards of
review under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Such clarification
should help ensure that Craigmiles is only an anomaly and not a sign that
Lochner lives.
59. See Kelso, supra note 58, at 256-57; Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: In-
termediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 802-03 (1987); Rogers, supra note 54, at 968.

